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The Public Sphere as Site of Emancipation and Enlightenment: A Discourse Theoretic
Critique of Digital Communication
David Ingram & Asaf Bar-Tura
October 4, 2013 (revised)
Habermas claims that an inclusive public sphere is the only deliberative forum for
generating public opinion that satisfies the epistemic and normative conditions underlying
legitimate decision-making. He adds that digital technologies and other mass media need
not undermine – but can extend – rational deliberation when properly instituted. This
paper draws from social epistemology and technology studies to demonstrate the
epistemic and normative limitations of this extension. We argue that current online
communication structures fall short of satisfying the required epistemic and normative
conditions. Furthermore, the extent to which Internet-based communications contribute to
legitimate democratic opinion and will formation depends on the design of the
technologies in question.
We develop our argument in four steps: First, (1) we situate Habermas’s discourse
theory of democracy as a response to the crisis of liberal democracy, which asks whether
and how the public sphere can remain a site of enlightenment and emancipation in an age
of mass media and communications. Second (2), we identify an epistemological deficit in
Habermas’s thinking about contemporary communication flows in the public sphere,
namely, we show that Habermas does not properly account for the affective dimension of
reasoning, thus highlighting the shortcomings of mediated communications. Third (3), we
identify a normative deficit in Internet-based communications when considered through
Habermas’s discourse-theoretic framework. In particular, we critically examine whether
digital media in fact allow for more marginalized voices to enter public discourse, thus
democratizing the public sphere, and argue that there are good reasons and good empirical
evidence to suggest that this is not the case. We conclude (4) by emphasizing that the
design of the technologies under discussion, and hence their social consequences, are not
predetermined. Technology is always underdetermined and always embodies specific
values. Hence, the design of the Internet itself, and the applications we use through it, begs
a public discussion based on democratic values.
Discourse Theory as a Response to the Crisis of Liberal Democracy
Ninety years ago Carl Schmitt observed that liberalism's faith in rational discussion as the
via regia toward legitimating a rule of law based on consensus had finally revealed itself for
what it truly was: an empty idealism premised on the hegemony of the bourgeoisie as the
proclaimed representative of humanity's universal interests (Schmitt, 1985). The
enfranchisement of the working class had transformed parliament into a more inclusive
body whose new mandate, Schmitt observed, was to advocate for the particular interests of
partisan constituencies through propaganda and backroom dealing. Schmitt further noted
that this perversion of the Millian ideal of representative democracy found parallel

expression in the unprecedented use of new techniques of mass communication in shaping
public opinion by means of spectacle and propaganda.
Schmitt’s diagnosis of the crisis of liberal democracy would resurface forty years
later in Habermas’s classical critique of the structural transformation of the public sphere
(Habermas, 1989). Writing today, it would seem that political life, then as now, has barely
changed. If anything, the propagandistic nature of political discourse as staged spectacle
has become even more apparent. To be sure, the concentration of media ownership and the
impact of big money on shaping public opinion is only one side of the story. One could cite
counter-movements in mass media – such as the explosion of cable TV networks and public
access broadcasting as well as the emergence of independent journalism and blog threads –
that promise greater diversity and inclusion of opinions. Digital social media are but the
latest examples of communication technology that promise to revitalize the public sphere
as a popular democratic forum for free, equal and inclusive discussion. It behooves critical
theorists to examine this potential in more detail. Can virtual communication replace faceto-face dialogue as a medium for rational enlightenment and self-transformation?
Habermas introduces his discourse theory in response to precisely this question.
Dissatisfied with Schmitt’s democracy/liberalism antithesis, he argues that both
legitimating principles (consent of the majority and respect for individual rights) have a
common ground in rational deliberation. Indeed, as is well known, Habermas defines
normative validity in general – be it moral, ethical, or legal – in terms of a procedure of
rational discourse. Valid are precisely those norms that all affected would agree upon
subsequent to an inclusive, free, and equal dialog in which conviction based on the best
argument holds sway. This counterfactual ideal perfectly captures the moral point of view
– that each person must be accountable to others, so that their reasonable (justifiable)
dissent must be respected. When transferred to the legal sphere the discourse principle
retains this reference to morality but with an important twist. The basic equal rights that it
stipulates do not impose a reciprocal moral duty to justify one’s actions but instead open
up a range of permissible action to which the individual rights holder need be accountable
to no one. Such liberal rights, however, are but empty principles of freedom unless
politically qualified by another application of the discourse principle, this one involving a
procedure of democratic consent.
The principle of democracy constructed on the basis of the principle of discourse
thus embodies liberal features – basic individual freedoms, equal protection from
discrimination, separation of powers, and the rule of law. Suffice it to say, Habermas’s
discourse theory has implications for the way in which the abstract features of a
procedurally just liberal democracy are concretely interpreted and institutionalized. The
constitutional flow of institutional power – from legislative deliberation and enactment to
executive and judicial application – should be entirely responsive to public opinion
undistorted by excessive influence emanating from government elites and private interests.
In a recent essay on normative democratic theory and empirical mass media studies,
Habermas formulates the liberal supposition that rational discourse can legitimate
democratic decision-making as an assumption
• That relevant issues and controversial answers, requisite information, and
appropriate arguments for and against will be mobilized;
• That the alternatives which emerge will be subjected to examination in
argumentation and will be evaluated accordingly; and

•

That rationally motivated ‘yes’ and ‘no’ positions on procedurally correct decisions
will be a deciding factor (Habermas, 2009: 162)

These three suppositions are satisfied differently depending on what public arena of the
“public sphere” they occur within: (1) the formal institutional debates that occur within the
political system; (2) the informal, everyday communications that occur within civil society;
or (3) the passive reception and reflective consideration of abstract information and public
opinion that occur in mass media (159). Beginning with the “peripheral” sphere of political
life that is furthest removed from political decision-making proper, Habermas identifies
civil society, composed of “citizen groups, advocates, churches, and intellectuals,” as well as
the social movements and social networks around which they organize themselves, as
responsible for communicating concerns of common interest, specifically about social
injustices (163). The “political communication” generated through physical encounter and
social media contains a large quantity of non-discursive expressions of social discontent,
involving the use of “story-telling and images, facial and bodily expressions in general,
testimonies, appeals, and the like” (154). The “wild” (spontaneous and unregulated) nature
of political expression within civil society, ranging from loud demonstrations of civil
disobedience to dispassionate arguments in academic forums, stands in sharp contrast to
the highly regulated arguments that occur within the center of political life, the political
system, which is charged with responding sensitively to the most vocal concerns circulating
in civil society as well as those emanating from lobbyists representing “industry and the
labor market, health care, traffic, energy, research and development, education” and other
“functional subsystems” (163). Less inclusive and free, but procedurally fairer, arguments
conducted by government officials within institutional settings, Habermas notes, abide by
strict courtroom and parliamentary procedures that are designed to ensure that all
participating parties have an equal voice in debating policies. But these rules impose
rational orderliness by subjecting speakers to severe time limits, legal frameworks, and
rules of civil decorum that constrain freedom to argue freely and exclude less mainstream
points of view. Intermediary between civil society and the political system is the massmediated sphere of communication, which is charged with condensing, refining, weighing,
and selecting public opinions emanating from civil advocacy groups, special interest
lobbyists, and politicians. When properly instituted, with appropriate government
regulation ensuring independent, fully representative, and roughly equal access, this arena
of the public sphere can counteract shortfalls in discursive rationality that dominate in civil
society and government by disseminating opinions more widely and by subjecting already
filtered arguments to a second level of public reflection.
Any possibility of democratic process producing rational, viz., legitimate, decisions
thus depends on the proper institution of the mass media. Assuming that rational
argumentation can have an impact on cooperative learning and political problem solving an assumption confirmed by empirical studies1 – the question arises whether mass media
can function as well as face-to-face focus group discussion in generating rational public
opinion formation conducive to reaching consensus.
The Affective Deficit of Digital Communications

A new structural transformation of the public sphere driven above all by digital
technological revolutions has accelerated and intensified the diversity of information flows.
It may seem that the resulting “communicative liquefaction of politics” has made it difficult
for any entity to monopolize political communication (154-5). Yet Habermas cites three
factors that speak against the prospect that this upsurge in political communication tracks
an increase in rational deliberation.
[T]wo deficits in particular immediately stand out: the lack of straightforward, faceto-face interactions, between really (or virtually) present participants, in a shared
practice of collective decision-making; and the lack of reciprocity between the roles
of speakers and addressees in an egalitarian exchange of opinions and claims. In
addition, the dynamics of mass communication betrays relations of power which
make a mockery of the presumption of a free play of arguments. The power of the
media to select messages and to shape their presentation is as much an intrinsic
feature of mass communication as the fact that other actors use their power to
influence the agenda, content, and presentation of public issues is typical of the
public sphere (154).
To begin with, mass communication “remains ‘abstract’ in so far as it disregards the actual
presence of the more or less passive recipients and ignores the immediateness of the
concrete glances, gestures, thoughts, and reactions of those who are present and
addressed” (156). By not being “open to the game of direct question and answer, the
exchange of affirmation and negation, assertion and contradiction,” mass communication
detaches the propositional content of opinions from the validity claim structure of
everyday communicative interaction, in which opinions are linked to a process of
argumentative challenge and redemption. In this respect it is more like a “price regulated
network of transactions between producers and consumers” (ibid).
Secondly, mass communication possesses an “asymmetrical structure,” insofar as it
reduces addressees to the status of passive spectators and consumers. Journalists and
politicians are like actors on a stage vying for the public’s applause. It is true, of course, that
the Internet has provided a censure-free mechanism for political communication in
authoritarian regimes that has led to remarkable (if short-lived) democratic victories (as
witnessed, for example, by the Arab Spring). But in liberal democracies the “chat rooms”
that seem to have “revived the historically submerged phenomenon of an egalitarian public
of reading and writing conversational partners and correspondents” have largely
crystalized around partisan or otherwise parochial niche audiences, thereby belying the
globalizing and decentering potential of the Internet and, Habermas adds, fragmenting the
public sphere further into entrenched and closed interest groups (158).
That said, Habermas insists that these structural deviations from rational discourse
do not necessarily mean that mass media fail to contribute to rational deliberation (158).
They contribute by filtering inputs from elites within civil society, government, and
functional subsystems in the form of published opinions, and then reflectively generating
public opinions (“clusters of controversial issues and inputs to which the parties concerned
intuitively attach weights in accordance with their perceptions of the cumulative ‘yes’ and
‘no’ stances of the wider public” as conveyed by a “representative spectrum of pooled
opinions reflected in survey data”) (165). Beyond this, mass media also enable a secondary

reflection on (already critically reflected) public opinion, which generates considered public
opinion, by which Habermas understands “a pair of contrary, more or less coherent
opinions, weighted in accordance with agreement and disagreement, which refer to a
relevant issue and express what appears at the time, in light of available information, to be
the most plausible or reasoned interpretations of a sufficiently relevant –though generally
controversial – issue” (166). Considered opinions “fix the parameters for the range of
possible decisions [made by political elites] which the public of voters would accept as
legitimate” (ibid). In this way, properly functioning mass media perform two invaluable
tasks in democratic deliberation: they return to civil society its own messages of
discontent, now reflectively worked up in the form of considered public opinion; and they
place such opinion before institutional deliberative bodies, commenting and observing how
well such bodies incorporate said opinion into their agendas and debates (162).
However, mass media function properly only if the power structures of the public
sphere and the dynamics of mass communication permit it. The public sphere is influenced
by political power, which shapes the legal regulations that constitute the diversity and
independence of the mass media. It is influenced by social power (especially economic
power), which must be exercised in a relatively transparent manner; and it is influenced by
media power, which shapes the content and formatting of public opinion according to its
own professional code of integrity (fairness and independence). Although Habermas
concedes that sectoral and government elites have a financial and organization advantage
in shaping public opinion according to their preferences relative to the “weak” and
“dispersed” publics that form civil society, he thinks that their strategic interventions can
be checked by the reflective counter-responses of a well regulated mass media. Whether
this actually happens depends not only on the independence of the media but – most
importantly – the “motivational dispositions and cognitive abilities” of average citizens.
Citizens, Habermas contends, “need not possess a large body of knowledge about politics”
in order to be knowledgeable in their reasoning about political choices” (172-3).
Habermas expresses considerable skepticism about whether these two conditions
are in fact met. In addressing the problem of independence, he notes that mass media may
be “incompletely differentiated” from their social and government environments. This was
the case with Italian government’s post war monopoly over the broadcasting system, when
each of the three major political parties recruited media personnel from its own ranks. A
potentially more sinister instance occurred when the National Security Agency enlisted
such telecommunications and Internet giants as Verizon, Telstra, Google, and Facebook in
tracking user data. Lack of independence may also take the form of a “temporary
dedifferentiation,” as when media and government collude for mutual advantage (favorable
news coverage in exchange for access) (174-6).
A second pathology manifests itself in citizen’s overly passive and uncritical
consumption of public opinion. Consumption is unequally partitioned among the various
sectors of society depending on educational achievement, social class, and cultural
marginalization (see below). Apathy, powerlessness, and cynicism, largely in response to
the devolution of political campaigns into image-making spectacles and the debasement of
news to “infotainment” (the oversimplification of complex issues), also reinforces the
passive consumer mentality of citizens (178-80).
Counterbalancing this gloomy diagnosis, Habermas cites studies showing that
citizens’ “ascriptive ties between political behavior and social and cultural backgrounds

have increasingly loosened” (178). Such loosening suggests a growing “independence of
political attitudes from determinants such as place of residence, social class, or religious
affiliation” (ibid). From this Habermas infers that public reason may be gaining the upper
hand over parochial prejudice when it comes to thinking about particular issues. The new
media-generated interest in participating in multiple “issue publics” centered on
immediate (short term), non-economic concerns has “pluralized” participation in distinct
but overlapping publics, thereby weakening monolithic partisan loyalties, ideological
antagonisms, and narrow group- and identity-based patterns of political association (ibid).
Habermas’s optimism about the impact of mass media in emancipating people from
prejudice and negative out-group stereotyping will receive further scrutiny below. Suffice it
say, Habermas remains ambivalent about the potential of mass media in facilitating
rational deliberation; although they are not structurally prevented from functioning this
way, social reality conspires to render such an outcome unlikely. Continuing with this line
of reasoning, we will consider how current forms of digital mass media exacerbate the
pathological tendencies noted above. But first we want to question Habermas’s bold
assertion that mass media are not structurally prevented from functioning as rational
media.
Habermas mentions that mediated communication lacks the critical give-and-take
that occurs in face-to-face conversation. What mediated communication potentially
possesses – and what face-to-face conversation lacks – is a critical distance from the
immediate spoken utterance that, in Habermas’s own words, enables a kind of delayed,
secondary reflection on what is said by other third parties. Furthermore, face-to-face
conversations can prove intimidating to people who have speech impediments or other
physical characteristics that place them at a disadvantage in arguing. Disembodied
communication can be less discriminatory, as Habermas (speaking of early disadvantages
suffered as a result of his own speech impediment) remarks. In any case, the apparent
structural disadvantage of abstract mediated communication disappears when considering
interactive media and chat rooms. If anything, these forms of communication appear to
combine the advantages of direct conversation and mediated reflection.
But do all structural disadvantages associated with mass media disappear? It would
seem not. In discussing how citizens’ political reasoning today is less overtly driven by
“ascriptive” features of their social positioning such as race, gender, ethnicity, social class,
and religion and more focused on the abstract merits of public policies, Habermas
downplays a problem whose seriousness he elsewhere acknowledges, namely the way that
social positioning indirectly biases our perception and critical analysis of policy issues.2
For instance, in the United States an affluent, white suburbanite’s critical processing of
information and arguments regarding government entitlements for poor people may be
distorted by a negative emotional response to the poor, colored by a stereotypical
understanding of who the poor are (for example, that they are undeserving racial
minorities). Such unconscious, socially-positioned in-group/out-group attitudes may not be
dislodged without the aid of positive, face-to-face encounters with a fairly broad swath of
poor people. Witness the recent sea-change in Americans’ regarding the acceptability of
same sex marriage. Would this change have occurred on the basis of rational arguments
alone, in abstraction from more personal engagement with gay citizens?
Perhaps mass media have contributed to public acceptance of gays (if so, their
record here as elsewhere is uneven). The larger point is that cognition (reasoning) has an

affective dimension; the reception of reasons requires empathy, which some media can
provoke better than others. Empathy requires communication, which need not be
dialogical or even personal (reading accounts of others experiences as narrated by
journalists may suffice to produce empathetic understanding). Indeed, embodied
communication may either advance or hinder empathetic understanding. However, just as
the emotional transference between analyst and analysand in psychoanalysis transpires
most effectively in person-to-person dialog, so too the therapeutic overcoming of defensive
reactions and resistances vis-à-vis others may require really encountering them. Those outgroups who resist or threaten our particular idealizations of security and happiness are
perceived as threats to our very identity, and so call forth feelings of guilt, resentment, and
anxiety. We objectify them as if they were outside the bounds of empathetic identification
and we demonize them by blaming them for our problems, projecting onto them our own
insecurities and feelings of inferiority. So, although mass-mediated discourse can
disseminate positive or negative images (and stereotypes) of marginalized groups that aid
or frustrate empathy towards them, the real work of dissolving prejudice may require faceto-face efforts at mutual understanding (Druckman, 2004, 675).
Are All Internet Users Created Equal?
Above we have examined the epistemological limits and possibilities of mass media vis-àvis the achievement of rational discourse and concluded that some of the therapeutic
advantages of face-to-face dialog concerning the facilitation of empathetic receptivity
toward standpoints and arguments advanced by others who are socially positioned
differently than ourselves might be lost at this abstract or distanced level of
communication. Now we turn to the normative claim in Habermas’s deliberative
framework, namely, that a public sphere that allows for deliberation that includes the
communication community of all those affected, especially those who are socially
marginalized and disempowered, is more just, and decisions based on such deliberations
are more legitimate. In particular, we critically examine whether digital media in fact allow
for more marginalized voices to enter public discourse, thus democratizing the public
sphere, and argue that there are good reasons and good empirical evidence to suggest that
this is not the case.
In 2006 Time magazine chose a surprising figure as its “Person of the Year”: You
(Grossman, 2006). The subtitle on the cover read: “Yes, you. You control the information
age. Welcome to your world.”3 This choice reflects the prevalent notion that the Internet
may lead to more intercultural understanding, more citizen participation, and a more
flourishing and vibrant democracy (Kellner, 2000; Bar-Tura, 2010).4 Indeed, the
development of communication networks has historically been a powerful force in shaping
the political public sphere and the meaning of discourse and action within it. Today many
theorists consider digital technology, and especially the rapid development of the Internet,
as a democratizing medium that promotes wider access and participation in the political
public sphere (Habermas, 2009, 143). Many who claim that the Internet is “democratizing”
politics often mean that the Internet is driving a redistribution of opportunities for political
influence. That is to say, more people can get involved in civic and political activities, can
increase their participation in the political public sphere, and have more access to positions
in which they can influence public debate. This change, it is often claimed, challenges the

monopoly of traditional elites over meaningful influence of the public sphere and the
political process (Hindman, 2009, 6). So, can digital communications fulfill the promise of
participatory parity?
In his attempt to account for the way in which peripheral topics enter the center of
public debate, Habermas argued in Between Facts and Norms that journalists, publicity
agents, and members of the press “collect information, make decisions about the selection
and presentation of ‘programs,’ and to a certain extent control the entry of topics,
contributions, and authors into the mass-media-dominated public sphere” (Habermas,
1998, 376). Due to the increasing complexity, cost, and centralization of effective channels
of mass communication, he pointed to increasing pressure on the media to select topics for
public discussion. He saw the spontaneous associations of civil society as forming “the
organizational substratum of the general public of citizens,” (Habermas, 1998, 376) while
the mass media and large agencies form the institutional “backbone” of the public sphere
(Habermas, 2009, 131-137).
However, with the advent of online social networks, blogs, and other “bottom up”
and “peer-to-peer” digital media, such centralization seems to have been diffused. It seems
that citizens are no longer reliant on centralized institutions for their information, and are
not dependent on the editorial selection process. “Media power,” as Habermas called it,
seems to have waned. The media gatekeepers no longer seem to control the flow of
information. Indeed, the gates seem to have been stampeded by millions of Internet users
who are raising their voices and speaking directly to their online audiences. Is this an
accurate description? We now turn our attention to the political economy of the Internet,
and how it creates and sustains socio-economic barriers to accessing the digital public
sphere.
The Access, Use and Skill Divides
Since the use of the Internet has become widespread, there has been much focus on what
has been dubbed the “digital divide.” This refers to the unequal access to Internet services
among various demographic groups (Lamb, 2013, 12-24). This inequality often follows
socio-economic inequalities and as such calls into question the degree to which the Internet
has an equalizing socio-economic effect. What follows is some sobering data regarding
Internet access.
Since its introduction to public use on a mass scale, the Internet has rapidly
expanded, growing from 16 million users worldwide in 1995 to over 2.2 billion in 2012
(Lamb, 2013, 3). But this growth is not spread evenly among all demographic groups.
Furthermore, while one might assume that this inequality is only between populations of
developed and developing countries, this is hardly the case. That is, inequalities in access to
the Internet persist in the United States, and can be traced along clear socio-economic lines.
Race and gender continue to be predictors of access to the Internet in the US. Disparities in
access and use of Internet technology still exist between Black citizens and Whites, favoring
the latter. Similar disparities exist between women and men, again favoring the latter
(Lamb, 2013, 6-7). That said, there are signs that disparities in Internet access along lines
of race and gender are slowly closing (Lamb, 2013, 12).

A 2012 study found that while one in five Americans does not use the Internet, by
far the social groups most negatively affected by the digital divide in the US are the elderly,
the poor, and the uneducated (Lamb, 2013, 4). More precisely:
• Education: Educational attainment is one of the strongest predictors for Internet
access, as 43% of adults without high school educations use the Internet, versus
71% of high school graduates – and 94% of college graduates.
• Income: Household income is strongly correlated to Internet use, “as only 62% of
those living in households making less than $30,000 per year use the internet,
compared with 86% of those making between $50,000 - 74,999 and 95% of those
making more than $75,000” (Lamb, 2013, 7).
• Age: Being 65 or older is a strong predictor of lack of Internet use.5
One might assume that as technology advances in its sophistication, it will also alleviate the
social inequalities associated with it. Perhaps surprisingly, however, there is good reason
to think that in some respects things are getting worse. In particular, broadband
communication technology is broadening the digital divide. Consider that in June 2000,
34% of American adults accessed the Internet at home via dial-up versus 3% who accessed
the Internet at home via broadband. A decade later, in May 2010, more than 66% of
American adults accessed the Internet at home via broadband and only 5% via dial up
(Lamb, 2013, 10). Lamb explains the significance of this technological shift in terms of
access:
The slower dial-up Internet connections that dominated the Internet landscape in
its early days were widely available due to the ubiquity of telephone and electrical
service, the two utility components needed for dial up access. The high penetration
rate of telephone technology, at over 94%, made adoption of dial up Internet as
simple as buying a computer, buying a modem and signing up for service. However,
broadband Internet, which is a much faster and more reliable upgrade over dial-up
service, required Internet service providers to build out networks with higher
bandwidth capacities than the existing telephone networks. Broad access suffered
because Internet service providers rolled out these new more expensive services in
higher income areas and charged accordingly. This initial deployment of broadband
Internet services left the poor shut out because they could scarcely pay for access to
dial up service, let alone the higher prices for new broadband service (Lamb, 2013,
9).
The shift toward broadband technology has created a “soft” digital divide; the divide
between those accessing the Internet via broadband, and those whose access utilizes
inferior technology, such as dial-up (the latter are predominantly poor and rural users).
This “soft” divide is still an important divide in access and not only quality of use, because
with the prevalence of broadband technology, much of the content on the Internet
(YouTube videos are but one example) simply cannot be seen with a dial-up connection
(Lamb, 2013, 10-11).
Indeed, the inequalities in access to Internet services are an important
consideration when assessing the degree to which the Internet is “democratizing” the
public sphere.6 However, access by itself is not the only factor to consider, and arguably not

even the most important. Hargittai has studied patterns of Internet usage extensively. Her
research shows that the skills one needs in order to use the Internet effectively are to a
large extent more stratified than the access itself (Hindman, 2009, 9).
Some might suggest that skill stratification will correlate more with age than other
variables, since many consider youth to be “digital natives.” Hence, according to this logic,
the “skill divide” is not a democratic deficit, but rather a natural process of cultural
adaptation to new technologies.7 To examine this “generational” argument regarding the
skill divide, Hargittai examined the variation in Internet skills among youth – the “Net
Generation.” She studied how people differ in their online abilities and activities, especially
in younger populations (Hargittai, 2010, 92). Her findings are informative.
First, Hargittai finds that increased Internet access does not necessarily translate to
increased Internet skills (Hargittai, 2010, 93). This means we should be concerned about
disparities in Internet skills above and beyond our concern for access. Second, her findings
with respect to Internet usage skills do point to reasons for concern regarding social
stratification. Her research finds that among younger populations, socio-economic status
and education (including the educational level of parents) are positively correlated to
higher levels of Internet skill (Hargittai, 2010, 106-108). When examined through the lens
of race, the findings show that youth of Asian and White ethnicities present better Internet
skills than those of Black and Hispanic youth (Hargittai, 2010, 105).
Perhaps the most important finding related to Internet usage skills and social
stratification is the ways in which these skills are put to use. To assess this, Hargittai
examined what she calls “Internet usage diversity.” That is, the diversity of Web sites
accessed by individuals on average. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the overwhelmingly
determining variable for diversity in Internet usage was level of skill (Hargittai, 2010, 109).
More interesting than the simple category of site diversity is the kind of sites accessed by
youth. For the purposes of her study, Hargittai distinguishes between two kinds of
activities over the Internet: (1) capital enhancing activities and (2) recreational activities.
Capital enhancing activities are defined as activities aimed at advancing one’s social and
financial capital, positively affecting one’s socio-economic status. Examples of capital
enhancing activities might be seeking health information, engaging in financial
transactions, job search, reading the news, and so on. Recreational activities are defined as
activities aimed at pleasure. These may include playing games, gambling, casual browsing,
and so on. Perhaps the most important finding is that higher levels of education and higher
level of Internet usage skill are positively correlated with more capital enhancing activities
(Hargittai, 2010, 95). This suggests that rather than leveling the playing field, Internet usage
is reinforcing the socially stratified status quo.
So far we have examined the Internet as a whole. But some might argue that while
online trends raise concerns, social networking sites (SNS) in particular deserve special
attention. Since SNS such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and others, are often lauded as
catalysts for increased access to political participation, it is worth examining whether the
stratifying trends that apply to the Internet also affect SNS and if so, whether they affect
them differently.. If similar trends do not apply to SNS, then it may be possible to view such
sites as “democratizing,” even if the broader usage of the Internet is not.
Unfortunately, here too Hargittai shows that “use of such sites is not randomly
distributed across a group of highly wired users. A person's gender, race and ethnicity, and
parental educational background are all associated with use [of social networking sites]”

(Hargittai, 2007).8 When using measures of the intensity (time spent on sites) and diversity
(how many social networking sites are utilized) of SNS usage, studies show that the use of
SNS is not random, and is directly motivated by social circumstances (Hargittai and Hsieh,
2010, 516-518).
Finally, in order to assess the possibility that Internet-based platforms will increase
participation in democratic processes, some studies compared trends of participation in
such processes (for example, in town hall meetings regarding municipal issues) when
participants were given the options of participating in person or via the Internet. Findings
show that socially advantaged groups tended to participate more in general, and in
particular tended to participate more in person. For example:
• Men (especially educated, politically concerned, male Caucasians) participated more
in all forms of participation, but dominated in live participation, while women
participated in greater percentages online (Monnoyer-Smith, 2012, 196, 201).9
• Homeowners participated more than tenants in general, and tenants participated
more online than live (Monnoyer-Smith, 2012, 197).
• The educated dominated all participation forms, and the uneducated were much
more likely to participate online than live (Monnoyer-Smith, 2012, 198).
Some scholars view such findings as endorsing a more optimistic hypothesis, namely, that
Internet platforms do in fact offer disadvantaged groups a medium for democratic
participation in which they feel more comfortable . This hypothesis rests on the assumption
that citizens choose to participate online or offline “because they feel the technological
arrangement provided is the best suited to their ability to express themselves, considering
the distribution of power within the deliberative space” (Monnoyer-Smith, 2012, 193).
However, this optimism may be misplaced. We need not assume that individuals
made the choice about online or offline participation based on what was perceived by them
to be in their best interest. It may be that their choices were constrained by available time,
other commitments, and so on. For example, attending a town hall meeting in person
requires more time (to get to and from the meeting). It also requires more control over
one’s time, which is often a luxury of socially advantaged individuals.
What is more, researchers have found that in circumstances where online and
offline modes of participation were available, in-person deliberation tended to support
“acquisition and exchange of information” while online participants focused more on the
accumulation of information (Monnoyer-Smith, 2012, 202-203). That is to say, not all forms
of democratic participation are created equal. In many cases where individuals of
disadvantaged social groups feel less comfortable with face-to-face deliberation, and might
nevertheless be able to participate online, these individuals are more likely to be losing out
on the opportunity to have their voices heard.
The Infrastructure Divide
For the most part, we experience the Internet visually through what appears on our
screen. This is the Internet’s “front end,” or user interface. Hence, less attention is given to
what happens behind the scenes in the Internet’s “back end.” When considering this “back
end,” we may think of various kinds of infrastructures that make our user experience
possible. This includes hardware such as computers, cables, satellites, giant servers that

store and process information, and more. The infrastructure also includes software, codes,
algorithms and so on.
Hence, the structure of the Internet is often described in terms of three layers: (1)
the hardware layer; (2) the code layer; and (3) the content layer. Matthew Hindman has
suggested that the link structure of the Internet is underrepresented in this tripartite
schema, and that this link structure is central in determining the flow of information on the
Internet. In order to capture the significance of this additional component, Hindman
suggests distinguishing a fourth layer – search (Hindman, 2009, 39-40). In fact, search
engines span through all three layers of hardware, code and content. The algorithm that
technology companies design for their search engines are key to understanding Internet
use patterns. Hindman explains that “[t]he network protocols that route data packets
around the Internet and the HTML code used to create Web pages say nothing about search
engines, and yet these tools now guide (and powerfully limit) most users’ online search
behavior. The technological specifications allow hyperlinks to point anywhere on the Web,
yet in practice social processes have distributed them in winners-take-all patterns”
(Hindman, 2009, 15).
It is true that the Web provides users with millions of choices about where to go to
get information, news, and so on. But the fact that these options are available in principle,
does mean that users utilize these options in practice. In fact, patterns of Internet usage
make it clear that they do not (Hindman, 2009, 56). The reason for “winner-takes-all”
patterns in Internet usage and visits to sites is not primarily direct commercial pressure.
Rather, the reason lies in the design of the Internet: “online concentration comes from the
sheer size of the medium and the inability of any citizen, no matter how sophisticated and
civic-minded, to cover it all” (Hindman, 2009, 57). Hence, the function of search algorithms
is to narrow down the choices, and highly networked sites – based on the link structure –
almost always prevail.10
When discussing the “infrastructure divide,” it is important to focus on the physical
infrastructure of search engines as well. Google Search, for example, is backed by vast
physical servers that store Web content. It is because of these vast servers, which cost
billions of dollars annually to purchase and maintain, that Google is able to provide the
search and date storage capacity that it does. A 2009 study showed that Google spent as
much on physical equipment as a typical telephone company (Hindman, 2009, 85). This
suggests that the Internet may not be lowering socio-economic barriers to entry, but rather
rearranging the location of the barriers.
In the case of traditional newspapers, for example, it is often pointed out that the
infrastructure needed to enter the market poses a barrier to newcomers. Hence, it is not
surprising that for the past several decades, less than 1% of U.S. daily newspapers have had
a direct competitor in the same city (Hindman, 2009, 83). On the face of things, the case of
the Internet is different. One does not need to overcome the costs of printing and
distribution. But this misguided analysis ignores the structure of how information is found
and circulated online. Creating content is relatively easy. Attracting online traffic to that
content at scale is far from easy, and the search and link structures work against
newcomers.11
Social Critique Informing Technological Design

The critical picture we have painted need not leave us powerless in the face of the concerns
raised regarding the role of digital communications in promoting a deliberative democracy.
The design of the technologies under discussion, and hence their social consequences, are
not predetermined. As critical theorists of technology have convincingly argued, society
simultaneously shapes technology as technology shapes society. Technology is not
essentially neutral, but neither is its nature predetermined. Technology is always
underdetermined and always embodies specific values. The World Wide Web is no
different. As the most prevalent application used over the Internet, the World Wide Web is
designed according to certain protocols, and it allows certain actions and functions, but not
others. What is important to see is that these design choices have consequences. They
determine how, and hence who, will be seen and heard online.
When one considers the underlying infrastructure and political economy of the
Internet – the vast server farms, the particular designs of the algorithms, the network’s link
structure, and so on – the optimistic picture of an Internet that is free and open to all
changes, and we get a complex landscape, in which some have more opportunity than
others. It seems that some (overly-optimistic) observers of the Internet do not pay enough
attention to its underlying industry. It is perhaps fitting, then, to return to Adorno’s
reflection, in which he explains why, along with Horkheimer, he distinguished between
“mass culture” and the “culture industry”:
The term culture industry was perhaps used for the first time in the book Dialectic
of Enlightenment, which Horkheimer and I published in Amsterdam in 1947. In our
drafts we spoke of 'mass culture'. We replaced that expression with 'culture
industry' in order to exclude from the outset the interpretation agreeable to its
advocates: that it is a matter of something like a culture that arises spontaneously
from the masses themselves, the contemporary form of popular art. From the latter
the culture industry must be distinguished in the extreme. The culture industry
fuses the old and familiar into a new quality. In all its branches, products which are
tailored for consumption by masses, and which to a great extent determine the
nature of that consumption, are manufactured more or less according to plan
(Adorno, 1991, 98).
Our focus here is not on culture per se, but on digital information and democratic
participation online. Consider a revised version of Adorno’s last sentence in the passage
above, as follows:
The Internet information industry fuses the old and familiar into a new quality. In all
its branches, products which are tailored for consumption by masses, and which to a
great extent determine the nature of that consumption, are manufactured more or
less according to plan.
The “plan” here need not be a malicious conspiracy. Rather, the point is that the
distribution of access to online participation in processes of democratic opinion and will
formation is a result of design. Moreover, there is reason to think that communication
technologies can be designed to ameliorate empathy gaps, and position discussants to
better experience and understand each other. This means that the design of the Internet

itself, and the applications we use through it, begs a public discussion based on democratic
values.
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1

Habermas cites experiments involving full informed deliberation – from the collective decision discussions of
Michael Neblo (2008) to the fully informed focus-group polling of James Fishkin (2005).
2
See his discussion of how interpretative frames and social perspectives shape preferences, and how face-to-face
conversations involving “heterogeneous groups” can counter parochialism (Habermas, 2009, 151; Druckman,
2004).
3
See cover image at: http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20061225,00.html (last retrieved December 14,
2010).
4
It may be helpful to clarify the difference between the “Internet” and the “World Wide Web,” since these are often,
mistakenly, used interchangeably. The Internet is the name for the large-scale interconnection of computer
networks. The World Wide Web (“the Web”) is one (the most popular) software application used on this
interconnected network. The Web uses an Internet language (“protocol”) called Hypertext Transfer Protocol (or

HTTP). Most content on the Internet appears on Web “pages” that use the HTTP protocol (hence Web pages have
the http:// prefix before the page address).
5
This should not be read as suggesting that young people are all indeed “digital natives.” As of 2008, 25% of young
people in the US do not have Internet access. Furthermore, lack of access presents a strong positive correlation with
lower socioeconomic status (Hargittai, 2010, 94).
6
We follow Hindman in using the verb “democratizing” here descriptively. That is, for the Internet to be
democratizing means it is “redistributing political influence; it is broadening the public sphere, increasing political
participation, involving citizens in political activities that were previously closed to them, and challenging the
monopoly of traditional elites” (Hindman, 2009, 6). Hindman adds that “proponents of participatory citizenship,
deliberative citizenship, and monitorial citizenship all focus on political equality – and particularly on making
formal political equality meaningful in practice” (Hindman, 2009, 8).
7
Research does in fact show that youth embrace new media technologies faster than older populations (see:
Coleman and Price, 2012, 36). However, one should proceed with caution: research shows that while general
Internet use over-represents younger populations, online politics does not (see Hindman, 2009, 68).
8
In particular, the level of parental education is shown to correlate very strongly with specific ways of SNS
interaction. For example, individuals with college-level (and above) educated parents are much more likely to
engage in “strong-tie” activities (i.e. activities involving close friends) via SNS (Hargittai and Hsieh, 2010, 526527). Furthermore, savvy Internet skills positively correlate to student GPA (Hargittai and Hsieh, 2010, 525, 531).
9
The gender variable is interesting in many ways. For example, when asked to self-report Internet proficiency,
women tend to claim lower levels of proficiency regarding Internet-related terms than men. However, other research
that was able to measure both actual and perceived online Internet abilities found that women rate their Internet
proficiency lower than their actual observed skills. (Hargittai, 2010, 104-106). For more on bias in self-reporting see
Donaldson and Grant-Vallone, 2002.
10
Jodi Dean has an insightful discussion of how network structures work, and consequently of the ways in which the
technology behind the Internet does not provide equal opportunity for varying sites to be seen, and the voices
presented by them to be heard. She explains that as in any network (cyber or “real”), “[h]ierarchies and hubs emerge
out of growth and preferential attachment.” Smaller, newer, or lesser known sites that seek publicity and attention on
the Web, will attach themselves through various links to sites that have established themselves as central hubs. In
the process, clusters of networked power inevitably form (Dean, 2009, 27-30).
11
A note of caution is in order here: From the description of infrastructure divide above, one might conclude that if
there was a diverse competitive market in various domains of the Internet (for example, Google, Yahoo and to a
lesser extent Microsoft have dominated the Internet search market for years), then we would have more diversity in
which sites get seen and read. But this is not necessarily the case. Studies have found that Yahoo and Google
searches, for example, still produce much of the same search results in the first results pages. This is especially
significant since past studies have shown that users rarely click on a search result beyond the first page. One study
found that 90% of users clicked on a link presented in the first page of results (Hindman, 2009, 59-60, 69).

